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Taxation of the Internet Economy: An Analysis of the Recent Changes to Taxation of 







In the past decade, the world economy has changed rapidly due to many external factors, 
including globalization and the interconnectivity of almost all nations.1  These rapid changes, as 
well as the growth and impact of the “sharing economy has changed different industries . . . [and] 
has generated billions of dollars” over the recent years.2  The sharing economy, also referred to as 
the “on-demand” or “the collaboration economy,” “includes a diverse and innovative group of 
companies that are driving consumer choice through the Internet sector,” including ride sharing 
applications like Uber and Lyft.3  This economic model is “defined as a peer-to-peer (P2P) based 
activity of acquiring, providing, or sharing access to goods and services that is often facilitated by 
a community based on-line platform.”4  
While there is likely no specific date in which the sharing economy began, some attribute 
the innovative model to the launch of eBay in 1995.5  Since its inception, it has become “one of 
the fastest growing business trends in history, with investors dumping more than $23 billion in 
 
*J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2021; B.A., New York University, 2018. 
1 Evelyn L. Chua et al., Sharing Economy: An Analysis of Airbnb Business Model and the Factors That Influence 
Consumer Adoption, REV. INTEGRATIVE BUS. & ECON., http://buscompress.com/uploads/3/4/9/8/34980536/riber_8-
s2_03_h18-019_19-37.pdf (last visited April 28, 2020). 
2 Evelyn L. Chua et al., Sharing Economy: An Analysis of Airbnb Business Model and the Factors That Influence 
Consumer Adoption, REV. INTEGRATIVE BUS. & ECON., http://buscompress.com/uploads/3/4/9/8/34980536/riber_8-
s2_03_h18-019_19-37.pdf (last visited April 28, 2020). 
3 Sharing Economy, INTERNET ASS’N, https://internetassociation.org/positions/sharing-economy/ (last visited April 
26, 2020); see also Bernard Marr, The Sharing Economy – What It Is, Examples, and How Big Data, Platforms and 
Algorithms Fuel It, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/10/21/the-sharing-economy-what-it-is-
examples-and-how-big-data-platforms-and-algorithms-fuel/#714c07e67c5a (last visited April 27, 2020). 
4 Jim Chappelow, Sharing Economy, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sharing-economy.asp 
(last visited April 29, 2020). 
5 Anastasia, An Introduction to Sharing Economy, CLEVERISM, https://www.cleverism.com/introduction-to-sharing-
economy/ (last visited April 29, 2020). 
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venture capital funding since 2010 into startups operating with a share-based model.”6  Yet, due 
to the fact that “many of these businesses are private, it is impossible to know the actual size of 
the sharing economy.”7  The idea “first bec[a]me widely recognized in 2011,” and “it was dubbed 
by TIME Magazine as one of the ‘Ten Ideas That Will Change the World.’”8  The popularity of 
the sharing economy has only increased since 2011.9  For example, in 2016 “[t]here were 44.8 
million adults using the increasingly popular sharing economy services in the United States.”10  
Further, this number is forecasted to increase “to 86.5 million by 2021.”11  
One of the “biggest pioneer[s]” of the sharing economy is the application Airbnb.12  The 
application “is an online community marketplace,” which “has now contributed more than ten 
million worldwide bookings in the so-called sharing economy.”13  The lplatform connects  and 
facilitates communication between the ‘host’ and the ‘guest,’ allowing for the reservation of short- 
or long-term rental accommodations, as well as “payment processing services at the time of 
booking.”14   
Airbnb took advantage of “insufficient hotel rooms” in the hotel industry with a vision to 
“help communit[ies] . . . earn money in a flexible way and strengthen local economies.”15  Since 
its inception in 2008, the application “has become a global phenomenon and “[i]n 2018, Airbnb 
 
6 Derek Miller, The Sharing Economy and How It Is Changing Industries, BALANCE SMB (2019), 
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/the-sharing-economy-and-how-it-changes-industries-4172234. 
7 Id. 
8 Anastasia, supra note 5.  
9 See id. 
10 S. Lock, Number of Sharing Economy Users in the U.S. 2016 – 2021, STATISTA (2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/289856/number-sharing-economy-users-us/. 
11 Id.  
12 Chua et al., supra note 2, at 20.  
13 Georgios Zervas & Davide Proserpio, The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the 
Hotel Industry, BOSTON UNIVERSITY (2016), 
http://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/files/2014/07/platform2014_submission_2.pdf (last visited April 30, 
2020). 
14 Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d 113, 116 (D. Mass. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15 Chua et al, supra note 1, at 20.  
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was valued at 38 billion U.S. dollars, up from 31 billion the previous year.”16  Yet, while “Airbnb 
has transformed travel accommodation in a unique way,” this transformation was not without 
consequences.17  Rather, since its inception, the “company has disrupted the operations of the 
hospitality industry and [has been] treated as a threat to [its] existing business model.”18  
For example, Airbnb has surpassed the traditional hospitality heavyweights in a variety of 
metrics, including having “surpassed the largest [hotel] chains in terms of number of rooms,” and 
has a “valuation twice as large as the Hilton Worldwide Holdings and Marriott International 
group.”19  In addition, studies have shown that “a 1% increase in Airbnb listings in Texas result[ed] 
in a 0.05% decrease in quarterly hotel revenues, an estimate compounded by Airbnb’s rapid 
growth.”20  This study demonstrates the main tension between Airbnb and the current hospitality 
model, as the company seems to be directly competing with established companies, rather than 
compensating for the lack of hotel rooms as mentioned previously.21  Studies have also shown that 
“by simulating various regulatory interventions informed by current events, such as limiting 
Airbnb hosts to a single listing, we find only a moderate mitigating impact on hotel revenues.”22  
Due to this, lawmakers from various states and countries have begun the complex task of creating 
regulating this new form of marketplace.23  
 
16 S. Lock, Company Value of Airbnb 2016-2018, STATISTA (2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/339845/company-value-and-equity-funding-of-airbnb/. 
17 Chua et al., supra note 1, at 20. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 See id.  
22 Zervas, supra note 12, at 1.  
23 See J. Brian Charles, As Airbnb Battles Cities Trying to Regulate It, One State Joins the Fight, GOVERNING, 
https://www.governing.com/topics/urban/gov-massachusetts-airbnb-housing-regulations.html. See also Shirley 
Nieuwland & Rianne Van Melik, Regulating Airbnb: How Cities Deal with Perceived Negative Externalities of 




Section Two of the comment will discuss the various models of Airbnb regulation enacted 
by different States across the county, as well as some regulations enacted by cities.  Section Three 
of the comment will focus on New Jersey’s model of regulating Airbnb, as well as short term 
rentals in general.  Additionally, this section will describe the recent changes to the laws enacted 
by Governor Murphy.  Section Four of the comment will compare the New Jersey model with the 
various other states in the country, as well as provide recommendations for future changes to New 
Jersey’s “Airbnb Tax.”  These recommendations will focus on ensuring that New Jersey’s taxation 
does not lead to a diminishment of the internet economy by overtaxing mere homeowners trying 
to earn some extra income, while also not allowing the sharing economy to drive the hotel industry 
out of business.  Section Five concludes. 
II. Regulations of Airbnb Nationwide 
The different states and cities that will be discussed prior to New Jersey are: (1) New York 
(as well as New York City); (2) New Orleans; (3) San Francisco; and (4) Boston.  Each region has 
some similarities regarding their regulatory structure, but no region that will be discussed is 
completely identical.  Yet, learning from the experiences of each of these regions is necessary to 
understand the possible implications of New Jersey’s regulator scheme, as well as the recent 
changes enacted by Governor Murphy.  
A. New York City 
New York City, which is “Airbnb’s largest domestic market,” has had a contentious 
relationship with the company since the home-sharing application was first introduced.24  This 
contentious relationship eventually led to litigation, in which the City of New York brought a 
public nuisance action against various entities which they claimed were operating “apartment 
 
24 Benjamin Weiser & J. David Goodman, Judge Blocks New York City Law Aimed at Curbing Airbnb Rentals, N.Y. 
TIMES (January 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/nyregion/nyc-airbnb-rentals.html. 
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hotels on the Upper West Side.”25  In addition to the nuisance claim, the City of New York claimed 
that these “apartment hotels” were in violation of a “complex web of rules formed by the City’s 
zoning resolutions dating back to 1916, the Multiple Dwelling Law, and the City’s Administrative 
Code.”26  
As a remedy, the City sought to “enjoin defendants from renting any units within the 
buildings for periods of less than 30 days,” which they referred to as a “transient occupancy.”27  
Yet, the court denied such an injunction, finding that the “record establishe[d] that the rental of 
units within buildings for short-term, nonpermanent occupancy is a practice with a long history, 
dating back to the 1940s, if not earlier.”28  This finding was furthered based on an interpretation 
of the laws and codes, specifically the inclusion of “as a rule” as used in “section 4(8)(a) of New 
York’s Multiple Dwelling Law.”29  The court determined that the use of such words in the code 
indicated a “secondary use of the building other than permanent occupancy.”30  Further, “[t]hat 
secondary use, according to the court, could include renting the residence.”31  Therefore, the court 
held that “class A multiple dwelling housing units could rent out a minority of their units for 
transient occupancy.”32 
Due to the holding in City of New York v. 330 Cont. LLC, the court created a “loophole for 
those who wanted to rent their home for short periods.”33  The New York legislature responded to 
 
25 City of New York v. 330 Cont. LLC, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2278. 
26 City of New York v. 330 Cont. LLC, 60 A.D.3d 226, 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).  The buildings in question were 
designated as Class A multiple dwellings.  Id. These dwellings were defined as “a multiple dwelling that is occupied 
for permanent residence purposes.  This class shall include tenements, flat houses, maisonette apartments, apartment 
houses, apartment hotels . . . and all other multiple dwellings except class B multiple dwellings.”  NY CLS Mult D § 
5 (8)(a).  Class B dwellings include “hotels, board rooms, and lodgings.”  Id. 
27 City of New York, Id. at 228 (emphasis added).  
28 City of New York, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2278 at 2.  
29 J.T. Minor, Foregoing the Cleaver for the Scalpel: How New York Can Add Some Nuance to Its Short-Term 
Rental Laws, 103 IOWA L. REV. 817, 821 (2018).  See City of New York, 60 A.D.3d at 231–32. 
30 City of New York, 60 A.D.3d at 231.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 821.  
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this holding by rejecting such a “loophole,” and enacted S.B. 6873-B.34  This law made clear that 
the New York State Senate was “overturning the court’s decision in 330 Continental LLC.”35 For 
example, the legislature consciously decided to delete the phrase “as a rule.”36  Further, the Bill’s 
sponsor provided an accompanying memorandum, which stated that: 
 “[t]he only ‘secondary’ transient use of class A dwelling units would be use by the 
permanent occupants . . . not corporate entities – for house guests, boarders, 
roomers or lodgers living within the household of the permanent occupants . . . 
when the permanent occupants are absent for personal reasons, such as vacation or 
for medical treatment.”37  
 
As such, the law made clear that “a residential multiple dwelling can only be used for what is 
termed ‘permanent resident purposes.’”38  
Further, the law allowed for two exceptions. First, there is a family member exception, 
which provides that immediate family members can occupy a dwelling for less than thirty days as 
a guest.39  The law defines family as “either a person occupying a dwelling and maintaining a 
household, with more than four boarders, roomers or lodgers, or two or more persons occupying a 
dwelling, living together and maintaining a common household.”40  Second, it is also not illegal to 
rent a room within a dwelling “if you are occupying your apartment at the same time.”41  This 
concept is demonstrated in the memorandum distributed by the Bill’s sponsor, which emphasized 
that a distinction is made when the permanent occupants are absent.42 
 
34 See id.  
35 Minor, supra note 29. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. (emphasis added).  This memorandum also allowed for use of the apartment “for circumstances such as the 
occasional pet or apartment ‘sitter,’” when the permanent resident is absent. Id. 
38 Jessica Dailey, An Introduction to New York’s Short Term Rental Laws, CURBED, 





42 See Minor, supra note 29.  
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Currently, New York applies the “traditional approach” to regulating short term rentals and 
online rental marketplaces.43  The “traditional approach” can be defined as legislatively prohibiting 
any short-term rentals, with strict fines for any short term rental owner.44  While this is the current 
model, as aforementioned, the model is the product of experimentation, which, due to recent 
litigation, is still ongoing and will likely continue to change.45  
B. New Orleans 
Another city that has been on the forefront of regulating home sharing applications, such 
as Airbnb, is New Orleans.46  While the city has had similar complaints and reservations from 
lawmakers as New York City, the model of regulation chosen by New Orleans has many 
differences from New York’s “traditional model.”47  The city’s first attempt to regulate Airbnb 
came in 2016, after years of what could be described as “liberal enforcement.”48  Unlike New York 
City, these regulations were made in conjunction with the company itself and included many 
compromises intended to appease any concerns New Orleans had with illegal short-term rentals.49  
For example, in New Orleans, “Airbnb agreed to share data – such as the names and 
addresses of its hosts – with the city.”50  In addition, “Airbnb also agreed that its hosts must operate 
with a permit, with hosts automatically being registered with the city when they sign up to the 
service.”51  Further, there were specific locations that had stricter regulation such as in the French 
 
43 See Stephanie J. Kightly, Note, Regulating Innovation: The Positive Economic Impact of Taxing Airbnb Like the 
Hotel Industry, 51 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 457, 458 (2018).  
44 Id.  See also Sean Hayes, Cuomo Signs Law That May Cripple Airbnb in NYC, N.Y.L. BLOG (2016), 
https://www.thenewyorklawblog.com/2016/10/Cuomo-enacts-new-airbnb-regulations.html. 
45 Weiser & Goodman, supra note 24. 
46 See Katie Benner, New Orleans Becomes New Model for Airbnb to Work with Cities, N.Y. TIMES (December 7, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/technology/new-orleans-airbnb-model.html. 
47 See id.  See also Knightly, supra note 43.  
48 Kevin Litten, Short-Term Rental Rules in New Orleans, NOLA, 
https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_b31c86de-8601-5d81-a726-89a220ff3648.html 





Quarter, in which Airbnb banned “almost all listings in the city’s historic” district “and set an 90-
day annual cap for hosts who rent out entire homes.”52 
Yet, while Airbnb and New Orleans had hoped that these compromises and regulations 
would lead to less unregulated rentals and complaints, it soon become clear that it was not 
sufficient to prevent illegal short term rentals.53  Due to this, the city chose to further enhance the 
regulation of the company by enacting stricter regulations in 2019.54  On January 10, 2019, “[t]he 
New Orleans City Council . . . made their stricter stance against short-term rentals official,” 
banning whole-home listings from historic residential neighborhoods, and all listings in the Garden 
District and the French Quarter.55  These two regulations “amounted to a major defeat for an 
industry that has flourished since more liberal regulations were adopted in late 2016.”56  When 
considering that the regulations passed unanimously, this decision bears even more significance.57 
C. San Francisco 
Similarly to New York City, San Francisco’s relationship with Airbnb could be described 
as contentious.58  Yet, compared with New York City, San Francisco has progressed to adopt a 
more “liberal perspective” on the company.59  This is a large departure from the city’s previous 
stance, which deemed all short-term rentals illegal, as they were deemed to “not only [violate] the 
San Francisco Administrative Code (“SFAC”), but [. . .] also . . . lease agreements as well.”60 
 
52 Id. 
53 See Litten, supra note 48.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 See Dana Palombo, Comment, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate Short-Term Residential 
Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 310 (2015) (“Until recently, short-term rentals were illegal in 





This ban prohibited “any residential rental . . .  less than 30 days in multi-unit buildings – 
a ban that effectively made most Airbnb-type rentals illegal.”61  Yet, while such a ban was 
technically on the books, this “law was rarely enforced.”62  
In 2014, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted to legalize short-term rentals with 
restrictions.63  The law imposed a limit on “non-hosted rentals for up to 90 days per year.”64 
Further, the law created a public registry, which required hosts to pay a fee ($50) to register with 
the city Planning Department.65  This registration also required the prospective landlord to pledge 
that they would “abide by the 90-day-limit.”66  In addition, San Francisco imposed the city’s hotel 
tax on any short-term rental.67  The law went into effect in February 2015.68  
In 2016, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors met again regarding Airbnb and voted 
unanimously to “toughen [the] short-term rental laws already on the books.”69  These changes were 
in response to the previous regulations being “proven difficult to enforce.”70  The Board created a 
requirement that Airbnb, and similar home sharing applications, are only allowed to “publish 
listings that include an official registration number that shows the property is officially approved 
by the city as a short-term rental.”71  Non-compliance could lead to fines up to $1,000 a day for 
each listing that violates the regulation.72  
 
61 Stephen Fishman, Overview of Airbnb Law in San Francisco, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/overview-airbnb-law-san-francisco.html (last visted April 29, 2020). 
62 Id. 
63 Kit-Mai Cutler, San Francisco Legalize, Regulates Airbnb with 7-4 Vote, Lots of Amendments, TECH CRUNCH 
(October 7, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/10/07/san-francisco-airbnb/. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Fishman, supra note 61.  




72 Id. (“Sites that don’t comply could face fines up to $1,00 daily for each listing in violation.”).  
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Airbnb eventually filed a lawsuit over this new law due to the possibility of being held 
liable for “hosts” not complying with the law, both “civilly and criminally.”73  This suit was ended 
by a settlement in which the San Francisco Board of Supervisors agreed to “what has been 
described as a ‘pass-through registration’ with the office of Short-Term Rentals.74  This required 
that Airbnb, and similar applications,  provide “the [o]ffice ‘with a monthly list of all San Francisco 
listings.’”75  In response to this change, Airbnb dropped the lawsuit.76 
Following the 2016 settlement, additional issues arose between San Francisco and home-
sharing applications.77 These disputes led to more attempts by the City to strengthen the 
“registration requirements and rental limitations imposed in 2015.”78  Further, these disputes also 
led Airbnb to file another lawsuit against the city.  Although, similar to the previous lawsuit, 
Airbnb eventually dropped the action in favor of a compromise with San Francisco.79  The most 
recent compromise requires that all hosts using home-sharing applications for short-term rentals 
must be registered with the State.80  Further, Airbnb and similar applications will no longer allow 
any unregistered hosts use their platform.81  These regulations have led to thousands of hosts and 
locations being removed from platforms.82 
 
73 Cyrus Farivar, San Francisco, Airbnb Settle Lawsuit over New Short-Term Rental Law, ARS TECHNICA, 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/05/san-francisco-airbnb-settle-lawsuit-over-new-short-term-rental-law/ 
(last visited April 29, 2020). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Katie Benner, Airbnb Settles Lawsuit with Its Hometown, San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/technology/airbnb-san-francisco-settle-registration-lawsuit.html (last visited 
April 29, 2020). 
78 Id.  See also Carolyn Said, Airbnb Loses Thousands of Hosts in SF as Registration Rules Kick in, S.F. CHRON. 




81 Said, supra note 78.  
82 Id. (“Airbnb has removed more than 2,600 listings.”) (“Flipkey has removed 498 San Francisco listings and has 




Like the aforementioned cities and states, the City of Boston has faced similar enforcement 
disputes with Airbnb and similar applications.  Additionally, these disputes have led to litigation 
and settlements between the two parties.83  
For example, in 2018, the City of Boston enacted “an Ordinance Allowing Short-Term 
Residential Rentals” in the city, in order to “provide a framework to allow and regulate short-term 
rentals . . . through a registration process.”84  The ordinance limited the type of property that could 
be used for short-rentals and restricted the amount of days such property could be used.85  Further, 
the ordinance required all units that would be used for short term rentals be registered, with fines 
are imposed for any violation.86  In response, Airbnb sought a preliminary injunction in order to 
prevent the enforcement of the Ordinance, which it alleged imposed “draconian regulations.”87 
This led the City to agree not to enforce the Ordinance until the case was complete.88 
At issue were three provisions within the Ordinance, namely: (1) The Penalties Provision89; 
(2) The Enforcement Provision90; and (3) The Data Provision.91  The court first addressed the 
“Penalties Provision,” finding that the language “echoe[d] ordinances enacted by San Francisco 
 
83 Rich Vetstein, Airbnb Seeks Federal Injunction Against Boston Short Term Rental Rules, MASS. REAL EST. L. 
BLOG, http://massrealestatelawblog.com/2018/11/13/airbnb-seeks-federal-injunction-against-boston-short-term-
rental-rules/. 
84 See Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d 113, 116 (D. Mass. 2019). 
85 Id. at 117. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 118.  See Zeninjor Enwemeka, Airbnb Settles Suit with Boston over Data Sharing Illegal Listings, 
BOSTONOMIX (August 29, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2019/08/29/airbnb-boston-settlement-
regulations. 
88 City of Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 118. 
89 Id. at 117 (“[A]ny Booking Agent who accepts a fee for booking a unit as a Short-Term Rental, where such unit is 
not an eligible Residential Unit, shall be fined three hundred dollars ($300) per violation per day.”).  The parties 
conceded that Airbnb was considered a “Booking Agent.”  Id. 
90 Id. (“The Commissioner shall enter into agreements with Booking Agents for assistance in enforcing the 
provisions of this section . . . [any] Booking Agent that fails to enter into such agreements to actively prevent, 
remove or de-list any ineligible listings shall be prohibited from conducting business in the City.”). 
91 Id. (“A Booking Agent shall provide to the City, on a monthly basis, an electronic report, in a format determined 
by the City, . . .  of the listings maintained, authorized, facilitated or advertised by the Booking Agent within the 
City of Boston.”). 
12 
 
and Santa Monica, both of which survived nearly identical challenges by Airbnb.”92  Although 
Airbnb argued that their conduct was shielded by the Communication Decency Act (“CDA”), the 
court found that because “the Penalties provision [was] aimed at regulating Airbnb’s own conduct, 
and not at punishing it for content provided by a third party,” it was not protected by the Act.93  In 
addition, the court rejected a challenge by Airbnb, which asserted that the provision would be 
unduly burdensome for the application and “require Airbnb to fundamentally . . . change the 
structure and operation of its platform.”94  As such, the Court upheld the Penalty provision in light 
of Airbnb’s challenge.95 
Second, regarding the “Enforcement Provision,” Airbnb asserted that it forced the company 
to “monitor third-party content or suffer complete banishment from Boston.”96  Due to this, the 
company argued that this provision “constitute[d] an explicit threat of liability based on its role as 
a publisher of information provided by third parties,” which violated their immunity provided by 
the CDA.97  While the City “initially resisted this view,” during the course of the litigation, “the 
City retreated on this point.”98  As such, the court found that “[i]n light of the City’s concessions” 
Airbnb would likely win the claim on the merits and granted a preliminary injunction concerning 
the “Enforcement Provision.”99 
Finally, Airbnb “challenge[d] the Data Provision under the Fourth Amendment” and the 
Stored Communications Act.100  In order to sustain this challenge, the court stated that the company 
 
92 Id.  See HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Monica, 918 F.3d 767, 680 (9th Cir. 2019); Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of 
San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
93 Id. at 120.  
94 City of Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 121.  





100 City of Boston, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 124.  
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had to establish that the City of Boston sought information “in which either Airbnb or its users 
ha[d] a reasonable expectation of privacy.”101  To determine this, the court separated the 
information requested into different categories.102  The most critical category, which the City 
conceded was “subject to a different analysis . . . was the usage data for a unit (i.e., the number of 
nights it was occupied in a given time period).”103  While the court denied the preliminary 
injunction for all other categories of data, the court enjoined enforcement of the “Data Provision” 
relating to the usage data.104  
Following the litigation, in 2019, the City of Boston and Airbnb reached an agreement 
pertaining to the city ordinance.105  The agreement provided a number of conditions, which were 
intended to appease concerns that the City of Boston had concern illegal listings.106  For example, 
the platform agreed to add a function that “asks hosts to enter their city-issued registration 
number.”107  This feature was initiated on September 1, 2019, and hosts that did not register with 
the city by December 1, 2019 “[would] have their listings taken down.”108  In addition, the City of 
Boston gained the power to notify Airbnb if it discovers an illegal listing and have such listing 
removed from the platform.109  The City’s concerns regarding illegal listings and data sharing were 
further appeased by requiring Airbnb to list data such as “zip code[s] . . . the type of rental unit 
and the Airbnb host ID.”110  Finally, the compromise required that “hosts must actually live in any 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 124–25.  
103 Id. at 125. 
104 Id. 








residence they are renting out on a short-term basis. Any other unit, which are referred to as 
“investor units” are banned from the city.111  
III. New Jersey’s Attempt to Regulate Short Term Rentals and Internet Marketplace  
Like the previously mentioned states and cities, lawmakers in the State of New Jersey have 
also attempted to use legislation and regulation to address possible concerns with the rise of 
Airbnb, as well as the “sharing economy” as a whole.112  The State’s first attempt at such regulation 
came when the State Legislature enacted N.J. Bill A1753 in 2018, which is now commonly referred 
to as the “Airbnb Bill.”113  Prior to the enactment of the “Airbnb Bill,” the state solely imposed the 
sales and use tax, as well as the hotel and motel occupancy fee, on the rental “for each occupancy 
of a room or rooms in a hotel.”114  
The “Airbnb Bill” was sponsored by four assemblypersons, including Annette Quijano (D-
Elizabeth), Valerie Vainieri Huttle (D-Englewood), Raj Mukherji (D-Jersey City), and Tom Giblin 
(D-Clifton).115  The law has been described as an “attempt to ensure fairness among all hospitality 
providers in New Jersey by imposing the same taxes and fees that hotels and motels currently must 
pay.”116  For example, Assemblywoman Quijano stated that “[o]ur laws need to be updated to keep 
up with changes brought about by new technology.”117  Specifically, the assemblywomen took 
issue with “[t]he fact that taxes are not paid for stays at locations rented through sites like Airbnb 
but are applied to stays in hotels,” which she found to be “an unfair advantage that hurts the 
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hospitality industry and takes funding away from municipalities for important programs.”118  
Assemblyman Raj Mukherji went so far as to state that the prior regulations “penaliz[ed] the choice 
to stay in a hotel or motel.”119  
Interestingly, unlike the company’s reaction to other legislation 120concerning the platform, 
Airbnb welcomed the regulation.121  In fact, Josh Meltzer, who was the head of Northeast public 
policy for Airbnb, stated that the platform “ha[d] fought for years to ensure that the short-term 
rental community can contribute tax revenue to support public services throughout New Jersey.”122  
The synopsis of the bill states that it “[i]mposes [the] State sales and use tax and hotel fee 
on transient accommodations.”123  Further, the bill “authorizes various municipal taxes and fees 
on transient accommodations.”124  The bill defines “transient accommodation” as “a room, group 
of rooms, or other living or sleeping space for the lodging of occupants, including but not limited 
to residences or buildings used as residences.”125  A technical bulletin issued by the New Jersey 
Department of Treasury explained that “[t]his definition includes rentals made through ‘transient 
space marketplaces,’ as well as rentals that are made directly by the homeowner through classified 
listing sites, local newspaper ads, referrals from friends/family, or placing a sign on the home, 
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etc.”126  A “transient space marketplace” is defined as “an online marketplace through which a 
person may offer transient accommodations or hotel rooms to individuals.127 
The first fee that the “Airbnb Bill” imposes is a sales tax on charges for rental  
accommodations at the rate of 6.625%.128  This rate is consistent with the sales tax charged 
universally throughout the state.129  While the law imposes this tax broadly on all “transient 
accommodations,” there are a number of exceptions provided for within the bill.  For example, if 
the “occupancy occurs for at least 90 consecutive days,” or the “occupant is the federal government 
or the State of New Jersey” the tax does not apply.130  Further, the state provides an exception if 
the rental of a transient accommodation is executed by a real estate broker.131  While this may 
seem like a simple exception, it is more complicated as there is criteria that must be satisfied in 
order to be exempt.132  In fact, in addition to the requirement that the rental be executed by a broker 
licensed by the New Jersey Real Estate Commission, the exemption requires that the keys be 
provided offsite by such a broker, the rental property be a private residential property, and no 
common hotel service can be provided (i.e., “such as maid service, room service, or linen-changing 
service”).133  
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Yet, the sales tax is not the only fee imposed by the State of New Jersey on “transient 
accommodations.”134  In addition, the “Airbnb Bill” imposes “the State Occupancy Fee at the rate 
of 5% on charges for the rental of transient accommodations that are subject to [the] Sales Tax.”135  
While, like the sales tax, this fee was applied universally across the state, if certain regions imposed 
“a local tax on the rental of transient accommodations,” the State Occupancy Fee was imposed at 
a lower rate for certain geographic regions, including: Atlantic City (1%), Newark and Jersey City 
(1%), and Wildwood, Wildwood Crest and North Wildwoods (3.15%).136  
In addition to the previously mentioned fees, the “Airbnb Bill” provides for authorization 
of similar assessments and fees specific to certain regions in the state.137  For example, the rental 
of transient accommodations in certain towns in Bergen and Hudson County are subject “to the 
3% Meadowland Regional Hotel Use Assessment.”138  Further, other specific taxes include the 
Atlantic City Luxury Tax, the Sports and Entertainment Facility Tax of Millville, and the Cape 
May County Tourism Tax and Assessment.139  Finally, as aforementioned, the bill not only 
includes fees imposed by the State of New Jersey but also “authorizes any New Jersey 
municipality, other than Newark, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Atlantic City, Wildwood, Wildwood 
Crest, and North Wildwood, to amend or adopt an ordinance that imposes the Municipal 
Occupancy Tax . . . which can be up to 3%.”140 All in all, the combined costs of the fees and 
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assessments generally totals to nearly a 12% tax on rentals of applicable transient 
accommodations.141 
Yet, the “Airbnb Bill” did not solely impose taxes on “transient accommodations,” it also 
requires that transient space marketplaces keep certain information for “four years after the 
transaction occurs.”142  This information includes: the names of the customer and person providing 
the transient accommodation; the address; “dates and nightly rates”; “[t]he municipal transient 
accommodation registration number, if applicable”; as well as “[s]uch other information as the 
Division may require.”143  
IV. Governor Murphy’s Change to the Short-Term Rental Tax 
A. Reaction to the Short-Term Rental Tax 
 
Soon after enactment, complaints began to surface, especially by “individual homeowners 
who rent directly to vacationers” and who “got lumped in with AirBnB and similar sites.”144  The 
“broad language” of the legislation “generally only excluded rentals arranged by realtors.”145  This 
meant that “arrangements made directly between property owner and renter in response to things 
like newspaper ads, Facebook posts, word of mouth and signs were still subject to the tax.”146  Due 
to overly broad construction, as one New Jersey realtor noted, the bill moved the listings away 
from the “larger for rent by owner sites” towards brokers.147  In turn, the bill merely incentivizes 
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“converting a tax to a commission,” which causes higher costs no matter the method of renting out 
transient accommodations.148 
 Such consequences were not intended, as “[a] Treasury Department spokesperson said the 
tax was ‘. . . intended to tax online rental services such as AirBnB to create a level playing field 
with existing hotels and motels that are subject to the tax.’”149  Yet, while not intended, the bill left 
longtime renters claiming that these regulations are causing renters to take “their vacation dollars 
elsewhere.”150  For example, Duane Watlington, the owner of VRLBI.com151, stated that in 2019 
“there [were] twice as many rental vacancies . . . compared with [the] previous years; further, he 
directly attributed this downturn to the “Airbnb Tax”, as “the other factors that normally affect 
summer tourism — gas prices, the economy, the weather  — were in good shape.”152  Despite this 
increase in vacancies, it is important to note that Airbnb continued to flourish within the State.153 
In fact, “[b]ookings through the online site are expect[ed] to grow 27 percent this summer to 
201,000.”154  In response, some of these renters created what is known as the New Jersey Shore 
Rentals Coalition.  The goal of the coalition was to have the State “exempt the homeowners along 
the Jersey Shore from paying the tax . . . [for] direct transactions between the homeowner and the 
guest that rents their house.”155   
Eventually, these complaints began resonating with lawmakers within the State, including 
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owners, who didn’t want to tack on the tax to their rental agreements.”  This led to the Governor 
signing a bill that “was promoted by the NJ Shore Rental Coalition,” to remedy the concerns of 
the occupancy tax’s broad application.  Governor Murphy stated that “he signed the bill after 
determining that the exemption extended to the vacation homeowners [in the new bill] was in 
keeping with the intent of the 2018 bill.”156  In effect, this new bill repealed the assessments 
imposed by the “Airbnb Bill” if the homeowners directly rent their homes to renters, similar to the 
exception provided in the original bill if an approved real estate broker is used.157  In addition, in 
order to receive the benefits of this new exemption the owner cannot rent “more than two units.”  
V. Analysis of the Short-Term Taxation Structure 
A. Analysis of the Airbnb Regulations Nationwide 
Before analyzing New Jersey’s attempt at taxing short-term rentals, it is imperative to first 
discuss the basic regulatory structures discussed in the various aforementioned cities.  Each of 
these cities have regulated short-term rentals, Airbnb specifically, for a longer period of time than 
New Jersey.158  Therefore, because their attempts have been demonstrated in the real world, they 
will serve as a guide for the potential benefits and consequences of New Jersey’s recent attempts. 
One common theme throughout the various regulation schemes includes attempts to 
prevent homeowners from operating their dwellings as pseudo hotels.159  This is an understandable 
undertaking, as it is reasonable to assume that home prices would be increased as an effect, 
especially in dense population centers such as New York City.160  The attempts to prevent these 
“apartment hotels” can be grouped into three general strategies: (1) use taxation to make hotels 
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more competitive; (2) require registration from potential listings; or (3) generally ban short-term 
rentals.  This analysis will address each strategy in turn.   
The use of taxation to make “apartment hotels” less economically feasible, and in turn 
reduce their frequency, has been employed by each regulatory scheme aforementioned.161  While 
each scheme may have differed on things such taxation percentage or qualifications for an 
occupancy tax, this seems to be the primary method of preventing or at least reducing “apartment 
hotels.”  In practice, the strategy has seemed to prove logical and somewhat effective at reducing 
the prevalence of short-term listings of private dwellings.162  Yet, that does not necessarily mean 
that a broad taxation scheme that encompasses all private dwellings and geographic regions has 
proven to be the most effective method, as demonstrated by New Jersey’s first failed attempt.  
For example, each of the regulatory schemes discussed in this comment, aside from New 
Jersey, are from metropolitan cities.163  Further, some of these cities have dealt with housing crises 
prior to the popularity of the “sharing economy.”164  While such a scheme may be effective for 
those conditions, that does not mean that such a scheme would be effective in, say, rural West 
Virginia.  Cities such as New Orleans and San Francisco have demonstrated an understanding of 
this concept by designating differing regulations for certain regions in their respective cities.165  
By adapting regulations to the conditions on the ground, it seems logical that regulatory schemes 
will prove more adaptable and effective.  Therefore, while it seems inarguable that taxation of 
short-term rentals is a necessary component of most “Airbnb” regulatory schemes, it is necessary 
to point out that a simple broad taxation scheme is not.  
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The second strategy, requiring the registration of dwellings for short-term rentals and the 
disclosure of certain information, is also generally universally applied by the aforementioned 
cities.  Similar to the taxation schemes, while each city required some sort of registration or 
information to be collected from homeowners that use Airbnb or like services, each city’s structure 
varied.  For example, while each user of Airbnb is automatically provided a registration number 
by the City of New Orleans, the City of San Francisco required users to pay a fee to receive a 
registration number from the city itself.166  Like the taxation schemes, the registration of users has 
proved to be an effective tool at reducing “apartment hotels” and short-term rentals in general.167  
Finally, the third major strategy employed is the complete ban on most short-term rentals. 
Unlike the previously mentioned two strategies, this scheme is not employed by all the 
aforementioned cities; instead, it is currently only applied in New York City.  But, as 
aforementioned, this strategy was originally employed in San Francisco.168  Yet, despite short-term 
rentals being banned by most of the buildings in the city, it is Airbnb’s largest domestic market.169  
Clearly, based on the amount of business conducted in the city, the ban and accompanying fines 
are not completely effective.  
Yet, after studying the various strategies and their effectiveness under different conditions 
it seems that none of these strategies could be effective without the addition of another, nor is it 
logical to say that any strategy should be completely neglected.  For example, despite the 
ineffectiveness of the ban of Airbnb in New York City, due to the housing crisis that has engulfed 
the city, it does not seem logical to abandon it.  In fact, studies demonstrate it may actually be 
logical to increase enforcement of the ban.  But the use of this strategy in certain regions, such as 
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the Jersey Shore, would be illogical and ineffective.  To summarize, no one strategy seems to be 
capable of solving regulatory issues concerning Airbnb; rather, an adaptable comprehensive 
strategy, employing a combination of techniques to account for the specific geographic conditions, 
is necessary.  
B. Analysis of New Jersey’s Airbnb Regulations 
While it is likely that New Jersey’s current regulatory scheme falls short of the ideal 
comprehensive strategy, due to the recent changes enacted by Governor Murphy, it is moving in 
the correct direction.  This conclusion is based on the following reasons, including the Governor’s 
decision to provide a complete exemption to homeowners that rent their homes directly with 
clients.170  As discussed prior, this was the main request from many of the affected homeowners 
within the State and the New Jersey Shore Rentals Coalition.171 
In effect, this exemption allows homeowners, who had previously been unaffected by an 
occupancy or hotel tax, to continue business as usual so long as they did not use any electronic 
platform to advertise the listing.172  Such an exemption seems to have been necessary based on the 
purpose of the original taxation structure.  For example, the purpose of the “Airbnb Bill,” as 
illustrated by the original sponsors of the bill, was to bring an even playing field to private short-
term renters and the hotel industry.173  Such a purpose does not seem to implicate an interest in 
bringing a homeowner who rents their private dwelling for one weekend a year on equal footing 
as the hotel industry.  Rather, the purpose was solely focused on preventing applications, such as 
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Airbnb, from allowing these homeowners a technological advantage that flipped the playing field.  
Therefore, this exception seems logical and will likely prove effective as it is implemented.174 
It seems imperative to inquire whether such an exemption went too short or should any use 
of a “sharing economy” platform subject to a tax.  One the one hand, it is arguable that a person 
who rents their apartment for one weekend a year should not be subject to the tax, even if an 
internet platform is utilized in advertising the listing.175  While plausible, such an argument has 
holes.  For example, there is a theory in Constitutional Law that explains that while a simple act 
may be irrelevant on its own, the aggregation of the effects if all similarly situated people 
performed such an act would be drastic.176  Such an analysis seems to be required here. 
While there will likely be few harmful effects from exempting a single homeowner from 
the tax if they rent out their apartment for a weekend, it is not so clear what the aggregate affect 
would be across the State.177  In fact, if only a quarter of the homes decided to rent out their 
dwelling for a single weekend, it seems reasonable that the number of listings would disadvantage 
hotels, which are subject to an occupancy tax.178  Therefore, to summarize, New Jersey’s taxation 
scheme for listings that utilize “sharing economy” platforms seems necessary and effective at 
preventing the adverse effects of “apartments hotels” (i.e., rising home prices).179  The tax puts 
people who use internet platforms on an equal playing field with the hotel industry, while 
exempting homeowners who rent without assistance.180 While it can be arguable that further 
exemptions are warranted, such an argument likely falls flat due to the aggregate effect further 
broad exemptions could cause. If warranted, any further exemption regarding a specific 
 
174 See id. 
175 See Gagis, supra note 143. 
176 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
177 See id. 
178 See id. 




homeowner should be narrowly tailored in order to avoid such aggregate effects.  Yet, overall, 
New Jersey’s current structure does not seem to be overly broad, while ensuring that it effectively 
implements the “Airbnb Bill” legislative purpose.181 
In addition to taxation, New Jersey’s regulatory scheme has positive aspects regarding the 
adaptability of the law.  For example, as aforementioned, the law allows for almost all 
municipalities within the state to amend the tax and implement their own policies. Such a 
mechanism has proven to be needed, especially considering the vast differences in social and 
geographic settings throughout the State.182  By providing each municipality the ability to amend 
the tax unilaterally, the New Jersey taxation scheme seems to have avoided the pitfalls that initial 
regulatory attempts faced due to broad taxes.183  
Finally, while New Jersey’s current scheme has positive aspects for a regulatory scheme 
in its infancy, there are some aspects that still need improvement.  The most pressing issue that 
needs improvement is greater collaboration with the applications themselves.  For example, New 
Orleans has demonstrated the positive aspects that a regulatory scheme can achieve given adequate 
cooperation between local governments and “sharing economy” applications.184  One feature that 
seemed to be very effective, with low costs, was all New Orleans renters being provided 
registration numbers once the application is first used.185  This should be a necessary feature in all 
regulatory schemes, as it likely will not cost the local governments anything, while providing an 
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In conclusion, like all of the regulatory schemes concerning Airbnb and the “sharing 
economy,” New Jersey’s recent attempt to prevent adverse effects from the technology will likely 
need further changes.  Even so, the recent changes enacted by Governor Murphy have set the State 
on a positive trajectory.  Any future changes should build on the positive aspects of the current 
scheme, such as allowing certain municipalities flexibility to create adaptions to the law.  
Additionally, it seems that the scheme could be improved with better cooperation between the 
State and “sharing economy” applications, similar to the scheme implemented in New Orleans.   
 
 
